OK folks, here's a complete copy of the current working copy of the
draft.
I'm aware that there are still issues in the terminology section.
Right now I'm a little more interested in getting some comments on
section 3. I'd rather you pointed out issues of which I and the other
editors are aware of rather than keeping quiet: this list has been
awfully quiet of late.
Some time ago John Dilley suggested using a non-graphical method of
representing the relationships. As I've dived into this stuff over the
past few days it's become obvious that we really need this to help
lock down the relationships. Some of the diagrams work and are easily
drawn. Others are not. If anyone has suggestions on how we can do
this (examples definitions for 3.2.1 [including where a client may not
use any proxy] and 3.2.3 would be useful if you're not going to do all
of them) I'd be grateful.
I'd also be grateful if a proponent of surrogates would send something
to get us started in section 3.2.2
Ian
Network Working Group I. Melve
Internet-Draft UNINETT
Expires: April 7, 2000 G. Tomlinson
Novell
I. Cooper
Mirror Image
October 8, 1999
Internet Web Replication and Caching Taxonomy
draft-ietf-wrec-taxonomy-02
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents
at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
To view the entire list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories, see
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 7, 2000.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This memo specifies standard terminology and the current taxonomy of
web replication and caching infrastructure deployed today. It
introduces standard concepts and protocols uses today within this
application domain. Currently deployed solutions employing this
technologies are presented to establish a standard taxonomy.
Research issues and HTTP proxy caching known problems are covered in
two accompanying document, and are not part of this document. This
document presents open protocols and points to published RFCs for
each protocol.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Base Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 First order derivative terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Second order derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Awaiting action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5 Topological terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6 Automatic use of proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Distributed System Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1 Replication Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.1 Client to Replica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.2 Inter-Replica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2 Proxy Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.1 Client to Non-Network Transparent Proxy . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2 Reverse Proxy to Origin Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3 Inter-Cache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3.1 (Caching) Proxy Meshes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.3.2 (Caching) Proxy Clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2.4 Network Element to Caching Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.4.1 Caching Proxies with Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.4.2 Out-of-path Transparent Caching Proxies . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Client to Replica Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1 Navigation Hyperlinks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2 URL Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3 DNS Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Inter-Replica Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1 Batch Driven Mirror Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2 Demand Driven Mirror Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3 Synchronized Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Client to Proxy Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1 Manual Proxy Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.2 Proxy Auto Configuration (PAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.3 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0 . . . . . . . . . 21
6.4 Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD) . . . . . . . . . 21
7. Inter-Cache Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1 Loosely coupled Inter-Cache Communication . . . . . . . . 23
7.1.1 Internet Cache Protocol (ICP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1.2 Hyper Text Caching Protocol (HTCP/0.0) . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.1.3 Cache Digest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1.4 Cache Pre-filling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.2 Tightly Coupled Inter-Cache Communication . . . . . . . . 26
7.2.1 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0 . . . . . . . . . 26
8. Network Element Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.1 Web Cache Coordination Protocol (WCCP) . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.2 Transparent Proxy Agent Control Protocol (TPACT) . . . . . 27
8.3 SOCKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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9.1 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9.1.1 Man in the middle attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9.1.2 Trusted third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9.1.3 Authentication based on IP number . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.2 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.2.1 Trusted third party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.2.2 Logs and legal implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9.3 Service security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.3.1 Denial of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.3.2 Replay attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.3.3 Stupid configuration of proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.3.4 Copyrighted transient copies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.3.5 Application level access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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1. Introduction
Since its introduction in 1990, the World-Wide Web has evolved from
a simple client server model into a sophisticated distributed
architecture. This evolution has been driven largely due to the
scaling problems associated with exponential growth. Distinct
paradigms and solutions have emerged to satisfy specific
requirements. Two core infrastructural components being employed to
meet the demands of this growth are replication and caching. In man
cases, there is a need for web caches and replicated services to be
able to coexist.
There are many protocols, both open and proprietary, employed in web
replication and caching today. A majority of the open protocols
include DNS[19], CacheDigest[22], CARP[9], HTTP[6], ICP[10], PAC[7],
SOCKS[17], TPACT[20], WPAD[8], and WCCP[16]. Additional protocols
are being planned to address emerging solution requirements.
This memo specifies standard terminology and the current taxonomy of
web replication and caching infrastructure deployed in the Internet
today. The principal goal of this document is to establish a common
understanding and reference point of this application domain.
We also expect that this document will be used in the creation of a
standard architectural framework for efficient, reliable, and
predictable service in a web which includes both replicas and caches.
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2. Terminology
The following terminology provides definitions of common terms used
within the IETF WREC working group documents. Base terms are taken,
where possible, from [5][6] and are included here for reference.
From these base terms we describe first- and second-order
derivatives as well as terms that describe common structural
language used within the community.
We highlight those terms that have become used colloquially to mean
something other than the definitions given in this document, and
strongly caution against such colloquial use in the future.
2.1 Base Terms
The majority of these terms are taken as-is from RFC 2616[6], and
are included here for reference.
client (as given in [6])
A program that establishes connections for the purpose of sending
requests.
server (as given in [6])
An application program that accepts connections in order to
service requests by sending back responses. Any given program may
be capable of being both a client and a server; our use of these
terms refers only to the role being performed by the program for
a particular connection, rather than to the program's
capabilities in general. Likewise, any server may act as an
origin server, proxy, gateway, or tunnel, switching behavior
based on the nature of each request.
proxy (as given in [6])
An intermediary program which acts as both a server and a client
for the purpose of making requests on behalf of other clients.
Requests are serviced internally or by passing them on, with
possible translation, to other servers. A proxy MUST implement
both the client and server requirements of this specification. A
"transparent proxy" is a proxy that does not modify the request
or response beyond what is required for proxy authentication and
identification. A "non-transparent proxy" is a proxy that
modifies the request or response in order to provide some added
service to the user agent, such as group annotation services,
media type transformation, protocol reduction, or anonymity
filtering. Except where either transparent or non-transparent
behavior is explicitly stated, the HTTP proxy requirements apply
to both types of proxies.
Note: The term "transparent proxy" refers to a semantically
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transparent proxy as described in [6], not what is commonly
understood within the caching community. We recommend that the term
"transparent proxy" is always prefixed to avoid confusion (e.g.
"network transparent proxy").
The above condition requiring implementation of both the server and
client requirements of HTTP/1.1 is only appropriate for a
non-transparent proxy.
cache (as given in [6])
A program's local store of response messages and the subsystem
that controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion. A
cache stores cacheable responses in order to reduce the response
time and network bandwidth consumption on future, equivalent
requests. Any client or server may include a cache, though a
cache cannot be used by a server that is acting as a tunnel.
Note: The term "cache" used alone often is meant as "caching proxy".
Ed.Note;IAN: This is the actual definition from RFC2616, but now
excludes consideration of a reduction in server load. Do we wish
to comment on that, is is response time related to server load in
such a way that the comment is unnecessary?
cacheable (as given in [6])
A response is cacheable if a cache is allowed to store a copy of
the response message for use in answering subsequent requests.
The rules for determining the cacheability of HTTP responses are
defined in section 13. Even if a resource is cacheable, there may
be additional constraints on whether a cache can use the cached
copy for a particular request.
tunnel (as given in [6])
An intermediary program which is acting as a blind relay between
two connections. Once active, a tunnel is not considered a party
to the HTTP communication, though the tunnel may have been
initiated by an HTTP request. The tunnel ceases to exist when
both ends of the relayed connections are closed.
Ed.Note;IAN: Should consider comments from Joe Touch on whether we
should distinguish types of tunnels
replica [ TBC ]
replication [ TBC ]
inbound/outbound (as given in [6])
Inbound and outbound refer to the request and response paths for
messages: "inbound" means "traveling toward the origin server",
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and "outbound" means "traveling toward the user agent"
2.2 First order derivative terms
The following terms are constructed taking the above base terms as
foundation.
origin server (as given in [6])
The server on which a given resource resides or is to be created.
user agent (as given in [6])
The client which initiates a request. These are often browsers,
editors, spiders (web-traversing robots), or other end user tools.
caching proxy
A proxy with a cache, acting as a server to clients, and a client
to servers
The following colloquial terms are also used to refer to caching
proxies:
* proxy
* cache
surrogate (a.k.a. "reverse proxies", "server accelerators")
An intermediary program which acts as a server or tunnel for the
purpose of responding to requests on behalf of one or more origin
servers. Requests are serviced internally from a cache or by
tunneling them on to origin servers. The implementation
requirements for surrogates have not been standardized; depending
on the implementation, surrogates may or may not respond to the
cache directives defined in [6]. Surrogates are also known as
"reverse proxies" and "(origin) server accelerators".
replica origin server / mirror [ TBC ]
2.3 Second order derivatives
The following terms further build on first order derivatives
authoritative reference
The owner of data; content production system; possibly an origin
server; the overall master copy of the content, if any
content consumer
The user or system that initiates requests of an origin server
(which may in turn be handled by a proxy).
browser
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A special instance of a user agent that acts as a content
presentation device for content consumers.
2.4 Awaiting action
A placeholder for terms that need to be considered/deleted/moved
network element
A network device that introduces multiple paths between source
and destination, transparent to HTTP.
[Ed note; IAN: This term probably needs a better name.]
2.5 Topological terms
The following definitions are added to describe caching device
topology:
user agent cache
The cache within the user agent program
local caching proxy
The caching proxy a user agent connects to [Ed note; IAN: should
this be renamed 'primary proxy'?]
intermediate caching proxy
Seen from the content consumer's view, all caches participating
in the caching mesh that are not the user agent's local caching
proxy
cache server
A server to requests made by local and intermediate caching
proxies, but which does not act as a proxy
cache array
A cluster of caching proxies, acting logically as one service and
partitioning the URL name space across the array. Also known as:
* diffused array
* cache cluster
caching mesh
a loosely coupled set of co-operating proxy- or caching- servers,
or clusters, acting independently but sharing cacheable content
between themselves using inter-cache communication protocols (see
Section 7)
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2.6 Automatic use of proxies
Moves to insert proxies into the network in a manner such at the
content consumer is unaware of their presence has created a set of
terms whose definitions may not be consistent with other uses. This
section references prior definitions but also gives their meaning in
the realm of Web caching.
proxy discovery
The discovery and configuration for use of a proxy in an
environment where the content consumer may be unaware of the
proxy's existence. The use of the proxy is transparent to the
content consumer, but not to the client.
[Ed note; IAN: should we consider the ability of proxies to discover
each other? Would this be better titled as "transparent proxy
configuration"?
traffic interception
The process of using a network element to examine network traffic
to determine whether it should be redirected
traffic redirection
Redirection of traffic from a user agent or network element to a
specific proxy, following its interception. Used to deploy
Web-caching without the need to manually reconfigure individual
user agents, or to force the use of a proxy where such use would
not otherwise occur
(network) transparent proxy
A proxy that receives traffic as a result of network traffic
redirection. The term "transparent proxy" is typically used to
refer to a network transparent proxy and the additional systems
that perform traffic redirection. The use of this type of proxy
is transparent to the client. Due to a conflicting definition in
[6], caution should be exercised when referring to a "transparent
proxy". As stated above, it is recommended that the phrase
"transparent proxy" is prepended with appropriate terminology to
avoide confusion.
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3. Distributed System Relationships
This section identifies the relationships that exist in a
distributed replication and caching environment. Having defined
these relationships, later sections describe the communication
protocols used in each relationship.
3.1 Replication Relationships
[Ed note; describe the replication system relationship domain]
3.1.1 Client to Replica
A client may communicate with one or more replica origin servers, as
well as with master origin servers (or in a non-replicated
environment directly with the origin server).
Persistent Domain
Complete Idem-Potent Set Replication
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
| Replica Origin | | Master Origin | | Replica Origin |
| Server | | Server | | Server |
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
\ | /
\ | /
-----------------------------------------
| Client to
----------------- Replica Server
| Client |
| |
-----------------
Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 4.
3.1.2 Inter-Replica
This is the relationship between master origin server(s)
["authoritative reference"] and replica origin servers, to replicate
data sets that are accessed by clients as shown in Section 3.1.1.
Persistent Domain
Complete Idem-Potent Set Replication
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
| Replica Origin |-----| Master Origin |-----| Replica Origin |
| Server | | Server | | Server |
------------------ ----------------- ------------------
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Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 5.
3.2 Proxy Relationships
There are a variety of ways in which (caching) proxies and cache
servers communicate with each other, and with clients.
3.2.1 Client to Non-Network Transparent Proxy
A client may communicate with zero or more proxies for some or all
requests. Where the result of communication results in no proxy
being used the relationship is between cache and origin server or
replica origin server (see Section 3.1.1).
Temporal Domain
Sparse Working Set Cache
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
| Local | | Local | | Local |
| Proxy | | Proxy | | Proxy |
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
\ | /
\ | /
-----------------------------------------
|
-----------------
| Client |
-----------------
Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 6.
3.2.2 Reverse Proxy to Origin Server
[Ed note; describe the accelerator relationship]
[Ed note; needs to be recast as relationship between surrogate and
origin server]
3.2.3 Inter-Cache
[Ed note; recast this as relationship not the definition which
follows in section 7] Inter-Cache: cooperation and communication
between caching proxies.
Inter-(caching)Proxy relationships exist in loosely coupled (mesh)
relationships, and tightly coupled (cluster) relationships.
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3.2.3.1 (Caching) Proxy Meshes
Within a loosely coupled mesh of (caching) proxies, communication
can happen at the same level, between siblings, and with one or more
parents.
[Ed note; Diagram needs updating]
Temporal Domain
Sparse Working Set Cache
-----------------
| Top-Level |
| Caching Proxy |
-----------------
/ \
/ \
----------------- -----------------
| Upper-Level |-----------| Upper-Level |
| Caching Proxy | | Caching Proxy |
----------------- -----------------
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
/ \ / \
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
| First Level |-----| First Level |-------| First Level |
| Caching Proxy | | Caching Proxy | | Caching Proxy |
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
An outbound request from a local (caching) proxy may be routed to
one of a number of intermediate (caching) proxies based on a
determination of whether that parent is better suited to resolving
the request.
Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 7.1.
3.2.3.2 (Caching) Proxy Clusters
[Ed note; is this really an inter-cache relationship?]
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+--------------------+
+--------------------+ |
+-------------------+ | |
| (Caching) Proxy | |----+
| Array |----+ ^ ^
+-------------------+ ^ ^ | |
^ ^ | |--+ |
| +----+ |
+------------------------+
Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 7.2.
3.2.4 Network Element to Caching Proxy
[Ed note; recast this as relationship not the definition which
follows in section 8] Network Element to Proxy Cache: cooperation
and communication between caching proxy and network elements.
Examples include routes and switches. Generally used for
transparent caching and/or diffused arrays.
A network element performing traffic interception may choose to
redirect requests from a client to a specific proxy within an array.
(It may also choose not to redirect the traffic, in which case the
relationship is between client and origin server or replica origin
server, see Section 3.1.1.)
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[Ed note; Should this diagram be re-drawn to show a proper "array"?]
Temporal Domain
Sparse Working Set Cache
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
| Caching Proxy | | Caching Proxy | | Caching Proxy |
| Array | | Array | | Array |
----------------- ----------------- -----------------
\ | /
\ | /
-----------------------------------------
|
--------------
| Network |
| Element |
--------------
|
|
------------
| Client |
------------
Protocols used in this relationship can be found in Section 8.
3.2.4.1 Caching Proxies with Transparency
[Ed note: Currently contains citations from NetApp document, need
rewording to avoid specific products and concentrate on generic
properties. Explain network elements and NATs and other ways
interception may happen. Intro to usage and "normal" setup.]
Reference [1][2][3][4] for introduction to caching proxies with
transparency.
The goal of intercepting web traffic is to provide a transparent web
proxy, thus avoiding the hassle of individually configuring each
client.
Transparency means that the user does not need to be aware of the
proxy.
The origin server see connections coming from the proxy, not from
the individual end user. Authentication based on client IP address
do not work if there is a transparent proxy cache in the way to the
web server.
A web cache is said to be transparent if clients can access the
cache without the need to configure their browsers, using either a
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proxy auto-configuration URL or a manual proxy setting. Transparent
caches appear as a seamless part of the network infrastructure,
rather than a set of discrete proxy servers, and function much like
a transparent firewall. Many ISPs and carriers desire transparent
caches because it lets them retrofit their network with caching
without action at the client. However, when deployed transparently,
a web cache must be as fail-safe and scalable as the rest of the
network. [2]
A transparent cache acts much like a gateway or firewall -- it
effectively sits between the users and the network. The advantage of
transparent caching is that it eliminates the need to configure
browsers to use caching. Another strength (and sometimes a weakness)
is that it is impossible to bypass caching. [2]
Conceptually, transparency works by modifying the TCP/IP stack of a
cache so that it operates in "promiscuous mode" and effectively
binds itself to all possible IP addresses. [2]
We need to give a far more abstract definition which includes the
way that router and switch redirection, and within-router action,
operate.
Comment on some of the problems:
o limited number of ports which can be captured
o due to "unexpected" data on other ports (or even on well known
ports), as experienced by setting up various services on port 80
o well known problems with use of HTTP for transport[18]
3.2.4.2 Out-of-path Transparent Caching Proxies
An Out-of-path Transparent Caching Proxy performs the same proxy and
caching functions as a Transparent Caching Proxy and is similarly
transparent to the client. However it does not lie on the forwarding
path between a client and a server and does not perform web traffic
interception. Instead it relies upon a redirecting network element
in the path between client and server to intercept and redirect web
traffic to it. One advantage of this method of transparent caching
is that in the case of cache failure the network element can,
providing it monitors the state of the caches, revert to forwarding
web traffic direct to the server. It is also possible for the
network element to distribute the web traffic load across a group of
caches. This method of transparent caching generally requires a
protocol to be run between the redirecting network element and the
cache or caches.
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4. Client to Replica Communication
This section describes the cooperation and communication between
clients (both user agents and proxy caches) and replica origin web
servers. Used to discover a optimal web origin server replica for a
web client to establish service with. Optimality is a policy based
decision, often based upon proximity, but may be based on other
criteria such as load.
4.1 Navigation Hyperlinks
Authoritative reference:
This memo.
Description:
The simplest of client to replica communication mechanisms. This
utilizes hyperlink URLs embedded in web pages that point to the
mirror sites. The human user manually selects the link of the
replica origin server they wish to use.
Security:
Relies on the protocol security associated with the URL scheme.
Deployment:
Probably the most commonly deployed client to replica
communication mechanism. Ubiquitous interoperability with humans.
Submitter:
Document editors.
4.2 URL Redirection
Authoritative reference:
This memo.
Description:
A simple and commonly used mechanism to connect web clients with
origin server replicas is to use URL redirection. Clients are
redirected to a optimal web server replica via the use of the
HTTP[6] protocol response code 307 Temporary Redirect. A web
client establishes HTTP communication with one of the web server
replicas. The initially contacted replica origin web server can
either choose to accept the service or redirect the client to the
proper replica. Refer to section 10.3.8 in HTTP/1.1 RFC2616 for
information on HTTP response code 307.
Security:
Relies entirely upon HTTP security.
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Deployment:
Observed at a number of large web sites. Extent of usage in the
Internet is unknown at this time.
Submitter:
Document editors.
[Ed note; Is this too specific for describing what Akamai etc.
currently do?]
4.3 DNS Redirection
[Ed note; it would have been nice to cite SONAR, but draft has
expired]
Authoritative reference:
Load balancing: RFC1794 DNS Support for Load Balancing
Proximity[19]: This memo
Description:
The Domain Name Service (DNS) provides a more sophisticated
client to replica communication mechanism. This is accomplished
by DNS servers that implement order of addresses based upon
quality of service policies. When a web client resolves the name
of a web server, the enhanced DNS server orders the IP addresses
of the web server starting with the most optimal replica and
ending with the least optimal replica.
Security:
Relies entirely upon DNS security.
Deployment:
Observed at a number of large web sites and large ISP web hosted
services. Extent of usage in the Internet is unknown at this
time.
Submitter:
Document editors.
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5. Inter-Replica Communication
This section describes the cooperation and communication between
replica origin servers. Used in replicating data sets between
origin servers.
5.1 Batch Driven Mirror Replication
Authoritative reference:
This memo.
Description:
In this model, the replica web server to be updated initiates
communication with a master origin web server. The communication
is established at intervals based upon queued transactions which
are scheduled for deferred processing. The scheduling mechanism
policies vary, but generally are reoccuring at a specified time.
Once communication is established, data sets are copied to the
initiating replica web server.
Security:
Relies upon the protocol being used to transfer the data set. FTP
and RDIST are the most common protocols observed.
Deployment:
Very common for mirror synchronization in the Internet.
Submitter:
Document editors.
5.2 Demand Driven Mirror Replication
Authoritative reference:
This memo.
Description:
In this model, the replica web server acquires the content as
needed due to demand. This is generally done by web server
accelerators (reverse proxy) operating as origin server replicas.
When a web client requests a URL that is not in the data set or
the replica origin server, the replica server attempts to acquire
it from a master origin server and forwarded on to the requesting
web client.
Security:
Relies upon the protocol being used to transfer the URLs. FTP,
Gopher, HTTP and ICP are the most common protocols observed.
Deployment:
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Observed at several large web sites. Extent of usage in the
Internet is unknown at this time.
Submitter:
Document editors.
5.3 Synchronized Replication
Authoritative reference:
This memo.
Ed note: there is no IETF protocol specified at this time. The
editors are aware of at least two open source protocols, AFS
and CODA, along with one expired IETF draft
<draft-leach-cifs-v1-spec-01.txt> and one proprietary protocol
Novell NRS; none of which can be considered an authoritative
reference
Description:
In this model, the replicated origin servers cooperate using
synchronized strategies and specialized replica protocols to keep
the replica data sets coherent. Synchronization strategies range
from tightly coherent (a few minutes) to loosely coherent (a few
or more hours). Updates occur between replicas based upon the
synchronization time constraints of the coherency model employed
and are generally in the form of deltas only.
Security:
All of the known protocols utilize strong cryptographic key
exchange methods, which are either based upon the Kerberos shared
secret model or the public/private key RSA model.
Deployment:
Observed at a few sites, primarily at university campuses.
Submitter:
Document editors.
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6. Client to Proxy Configuration
This section describes the configuration, cooperation and
communication between end user clients (browsers and applications) a
proxy.
6.1 Manual Proxy Configuration
Authoritative reference:
This memo.
Description:
Each user needs to configure its web client by typing in
information pertaining to proxied protocols and local policies.
Security:
The potential for doing wrong is high, as each user individually
sets preferences.
Deployment:
Widely deployed, used in all current browsers. Most browsers
support other options as well.
Submitter:
Document editors.
6.2 Proxy Auto Configuration (PAC)
[Ed note: Does it really need to be submitted for Informational RFC?]
Authoritative reference:
No RFC published, no Internet-Draft Navigator Proxy Auto-Config
File Format[7]. Available from
http://home.netscape.com/eng/mozilla/2.0/relnotes/demo/proxy-live.html[24]
Description:
A JavaScript page on a web server hands out information on where
to find proxies. Clients need to point at the URL of this page.
No bootstrap mechanism, manual configuration necessary.
Manual configuration is made easier by centralizing the script to
one URL.
Security:
Common policy per organization possible. Does still require
manual configuration. PAC is better than "manual proxy
configuration" because with PAC administrators can update the
proxy configuration without user intervention.
Interoperability of PAC files is not as good as wanted, since
more popular browsers have slightly different interpretation of
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the script, and this may lead to undesired effects.
Deployment:
Implemented in most web clients.
Submitter:
Document editors.
6.3 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0
[Ed note: Current draft expired. A new draft must submitted and this
section completed for this protocol to be considered in the Taxonomy]
Authoritative reference:
Expired Internet-Draft draft-vinod-carp-v1-03.txt Work in
progress.
Description:
Clients may use CARP directly as a hash function based proxy
selection mechanism. They need to be configured with the location
of the cluster information.
Security:
Deployment:
Submitter:
6.4 Web Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (WPAD)
Authoritative reference:
Internet Draft <draft-ietf-wrec-wpad-00.txt> [Ed note; I-D
submission anticipated by 6/25/99] Work in progress.
Description:
WPAD uses a collection of pre-existing Internet resource
discovery mechanisms to perform web proxy auto-discovery.
The only goal of WPAD is to locate the PAC URL. WPAD does not
specify which proxies will be used. WPAD gets you to the PAC URL,
and the PAC script chooses the proxies for you.
The WPAD protocol specifies the following:
* how to use each mechanism for the specific purpose of web
proxy auto-discovery
* the order in which the mechanisms should be performed
* the minimal set of mechanisms which must be attempted by a
WPAD compliant web client
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The resource discovery mechanisms utilized by WPAD are as follows:
* Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol DHCP
* Service Location Protocol SLP
* "Well Known Aliases" using DNS A records
* DNS SRV records
* "service: URLs" in DNS TXT records
Security:
Relies upon DNS and HTTP security.
Deployment:
Implemented in web clients and caching proxy servers. More than
two independent implementations.
Submitter:
Josh Cohen, Microsoft, joshco@microsoft.com
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7. Inter-Cache Communication
[Ed note: INGRID. Review and chase submissions (push Duane)]
7.1 Loosely coupled Inter-Cache Communication
This section describes the cooperation and communication between
caching proxies.
7.1.1 Internet Cache Protocol (ICP)
See [10][11][12][13][14]
Authoritative reference:
RFC 2186 Internet Cache Protocol (ICP), version 2
Description:
ICP is used by caches to query other caches about web objects, to
see if a web object is present at the other cache.
ICP uses UDP. Since UDP is unreliable, an estimate of network
congestion and availability may be calculated by ICP loss. This
rudimentary loss measurement does, together with round trip times
provide a load balancing method for caches.
Security:
ICP does not convey information about HTTP headers associated
with a web object. HTTP headers may include access control and
cache directives, Since caches ask for objects, and then download
the objects using HTTP, false cache hits may occur (object
present in cache, but not accessible for sibling cache is one
example).
ICP suffer from all the security problems of UDP.
Deployment:
Widely deployed. Most current cache implementations support ICP
in one form or the other.
Submitter:
Document editors.
7.1.2 Hyper Text Caching Protocol (HTCP/0.0)
See [23]
[Ed note: Based upon reviewers comments, the editors would like to
drop this protocol from current Taxonomy consideration, due to its
experimental nature]
Authoritative reference:
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Internet Draft draft-vixie-htcp-proto-05.txt, Work in Progress
Description:
HTCP is a protocol for discovering HTTP caches and cached data,
managing sets of HTTP caches, and monitoring cache activity.
HTCP includes HTTP headers, while ICPv2 does not. HTTP headers
are vital information for web proxy caches.
Security:
Optionally uses the MD5 shared secret authentication. Lack of
authentication option make protocol subject to attack.
Deployment:
Implemented in caching proxies (two independent implementations)
Submitter:
Document editors.
7.1.3 Cache Digest
See [22]
[Ed note: Does it really need to be submitted for Informational RFC?]
Authoritative reference:
No RFC published, no Internet-Draft Cache Digest specification
http://squid.nlanr.net/Squid/CacheDigest/ cache-digest-v5.txt
Squid Digest FAQ entry
http://squid.nlanr.net/Squid/FAQ/FAQ-16.html
Description:
Cache Digests are a response to the problems of latency and
congestion associated with previous inter-cache communications
mechanisms such as the Internet Cache Protocol (ICP) [10][11] and
the HyperText Cache Protocol[23]. Unlike most of these protocols,
Cache Digests support peering between cache servers without a
request-response exchange taking place. Instead, a summary of the
contents of the server (the Digest) is fetched by other servers
which peer with it. Using Cache Digests it is possible to
determine with a relatively high degree of accuracy whether a
given URL is cached by a particular server.
Cache Digests are both an exchange protocol and a data format
[22].
Security:
If the contents of a Digest is sensitive, it should be protected
from access by The Wrong People. Any methods which would normally
be applied to secure an HTTP connection can be applied to Cache
Digests.
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A 'Trojan horse' attack is currently possible in a cache mesh:
Cache A can build a fake peer Digest for cache B and serve it to
B's peers if requested. This way A can direct traffic toward/from
B. The impact of this problem is minimized by the 'pull' model of
transferring Cache Digests from one server to another.
Cache Digests provide knowledge about peer cache content on a URL
level. Hence, they do not dictate a particular level of policy
management and can be used to implement various policies on any
level (user, organization, etc.).
Deployment:
Cache Digests are supported in Squid; several commercial vendors
are looking into Digest support.
Cache Meshes:
* NLANR Mesh
* TF-CACHE mesh (European Academic networks)
Submitter:
Alex Rousskov, NLANR, rousskov@nlanr.net
7.1.4 Cache Pre-filling
See [21]
Authoritative reference:
Internet Draft <draft-lovric-francetelecom-satellites-00.txt>
Work in progress.
Description:
Cache pre-filling is a push-caching implementation. It is
particularly well adapted to IP-multicast networks because it
allows preselected URLs to be inserted in one single time within
all the caches that belong to the targeted multicast group.
Different implementations of cache pre-filling already exist,
especially in satellite contexts. However, there is still no
standard for this kind of push-caching and vendors propose
solutions either based on dedicated equipments or public domain
caches extended with a pre-filling module.
Security:
Relies on the inter cache protocols being employed.
Deployment:
Observed in two commercial content distribution service providers.
Submitter:
Ivan Lovric, France Telecom, ivan.lovric@cnet.francetelecom.fr
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7.2 Tightly Coupled Inter-Cache Communication
7.2.1 Cache Array Routing Protocol (CARP) v1.0
[9]
[Ed note: Current draft expired. A new draft must submitted and this
section completed for this protocol to be considered in the Taxonomy]
Authoritative reference:
Work in Progress: Internet-Draft draft-vinod-carp-v1-03.txt
Description:
CARP is a hashing function for dividing URL-space among a cluster
of proxy caches. Included in CARP is the definition of a Proxy
Array Membership Table, and ways to download this information.
An HTTP client agent (either a proxy server or a client browser)
which implements CARP v1.0 can allocate and intelligently route
requests for the correct URLs to any member of the Proxy Array.
Due to the resulting sorting of requests through these proxies,
duplication of cache contents is eliminated and global cache hit
rates may be improved.
Security:
Deployment:
Implemented in caching proxy servers. More than two independent
implementations.
Submitter:
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8. Network Element Communication
This section describes the cooperation and communication between
caching proxy and network elements. Examples include routers and
switches. Generally used for transparent caching and/or diffused
arrays.
8.1 Web Cache Coordination Protocol (WCCP)
Authoritative reference:
Internet Draft <draft-ietf-wrec-web-pro-00.txt> [16] Work in
progress.
Description:
WCCP V1 runs between a router functioning as a redirecting
network element and out-of-path transparent caching proxies. The
protocol allows one or more caching proxies to register
themselves with a single router to receive redirected web
traffic. It also allows one of the proxies, the designated proxy,
to dictate to the router how redirected web traffic is
distributed across the caching proxies.
Security:
WCCP V1 has no security features.
Deployment:
Network elements: WCCP V1 is deployed on a wide range of Cisco
routers.
Caching proxies: WCCP V1 is deployed on a number of vendors'
caches.
Submitter:
David Forster, CISCO, dforster@cisco.com
8.2 Transparent Proxy Agent Control Protocol (TPACT)
Authoritative reference: [Ed note; anticipated submission]
Internet Draft <draft-ietf-wrec-tpact-00.txt> [20] [Ed note; I-D
submission anticipated by 6/25/99] Work in progress.
Description:
TPACT runs between a network elements (router or switch)
functioning as a redirecting network element and out-of-path
transparent caching proxies. The protocol allows one or more
caching proxies to register themselves with a single network
element to receive redirected web traffic. All of the
participating caching proxies operate as a quorum in the
diectating of web traffic distribution across the group.
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Security:
MD5 is optionally employed for authentication. Sequence numbers
are employed as security against replay attacks.
Deployment:
Network elements: TPACT is prototyped and being evaluated on
multiple vendor L4 switches. Caching proxies: TPACT is
prototyped and being evaluated on multiple vendor caches.
Submitter:
John Martin, Network Appliance, jmartin@netapp.com
8.3 SOCKS
Authoritative reference:
RFC1928 SOCKS Protocol Version 5 [17]
Description:
SOCKS is primarily used as a proxy cache to firewall protocol.
Although, firewalls don't conform to the narrowly defined network
element definition of routers and switches, they are a integral
part of the network infrastructure. When used in conjunction
with a firewall, SOCKS provides a authenticated tunnel between
the proxy cache and the firewall.
Security:
A extensive framework provides for multiple authentication
methods. Currently, SSL, CHAP, DES, 3DES are known to be
available.
Deployment:
SOCKS is been widely deployed in the Internet.
Submitter:
Document editors.
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9. Security Considerations
This document is provides a taxonomy for web caching and
replication. Recommended practice, architecture and protocols are
not described in detail.
Replication and caching means copying objects. There are legal
implication of making and keeping transient or permanent copies,
these are not covered in the security considerations.
Information on security in each protocol is provided in the
description of the protocol, and in the accompanying documentation
of each protocol. HTTP security is discussed in section 15 of
RFC2616[6], the HTTP/1.1 specification, and to a lesser extent in
RFC1945[15], the HTTP/1.0 specification. RFC2616 contains security
consideration for HTTP proxies.
Caching proxies have the same security issues as other application
level proxies. Application level proxies are not covered in these
security considerations. Authentication based on client IP number is
problematic when connecting through a proxy, details are not
discussed here.
9.1 Authentication
Requests for web objects and responses to such requests may go to
replicas and/or flow through proxies. The integrity of the
communication needs to be preserved, to ensure protection of access
to the communication and protect the communication exchange from
unintended change. In the case of security breach, the culprit needs
to be identified
9.1.1 Man in the middle attacks
HTTP proxies are men-in-the-middle, the perfect place for a
man-in-the-middle-attack. A discussion of this is found in section
15 of RFC2616[6].
9.1.2 Trusted third party
A proxy must either be trusted to act on behalf of server and/or
client, or it must act as a tunnel. When presenting cached objects
to clients, the clients need to trust the caching proxy to act on
behalf on the origin server.
A replica may get accreditation from the origin server.
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9.1.3 Authentication based on IP number
Authentication based on client IP number is problematic when
connecting through a proxy, as the authenticating server sees the
proxy's IP number. One (not recommended) solution to this is
spoofing the client's IP number.
Authentication based on IP number assumes that the end-to-end
properties of the Internet are preserved. This is typically not the
case for a network transparent proxy.
9.2 Privacy
9.2.1 Trusted third party
When using a replication service, you need to trust both the replica
and the object location service. A object location service is used
to find the replicated object. Current examples include DNS round
robin, manual mirror lists, URNs, HTTP redirecting.
Redirection of traffic, either by redirecting to replicas or by
redirection done by proxies, may introduce third parties the end
user and/or origin server need to trust. In the case of network
transparent proxies, such trusted third parties are often unknown to
both end points of the communication. Unknown trusted third parties
may have security implications.
Both proxies and location services may have access to aggregated
access information. A proxy typically knows about all access by all
the clients using it, information that is more sensitive than the
information held by one origin server.
9.2.2 Logs and legal implications
Logs from proxies need to be kept secure, as they provide
information about users and end user patterns. A proxy log is even
more sensitive than a web server log, as all requests from the user
population goes through the proxy. Logs from replication servers may
need to be amalgamated to get aggregated statistics from a service,
transporting logs across borders may have legal implications. Log
handling is restricted by law in some countries.
Requirements for object security and privacy are the same in a web
replication and caching system as it is in the Internet at large.
The only reliable solution is strong cryptography. End to end
encryption does not necessarily make objects cacheable, as is the
case of SSL encrypted web sessions.
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9.3 Service security
9.3.1 Denial of service
Any redirection of traffic is susceptible to denial of service
attacks at the redirect point, and both proxies and location
services may redirect traffic.
By attacking a proxy, access to all servers may be denied for a
large set of clients.
It has been argued that introduction of a network transparent proxy
is denial of service since the end to end nature of the Internet is
destroyed without the end users knowledge.
9.3.2 Replay attack
A caching proxy is by definition a replay attack.
9.3.3 Stupid configuration of proxies
It is quite easy to have a stupid configuration which will harm
service for end users. This is the most common security problem with
proxies.
9.3.4 Copyrighted transient copies
The legislative forces of the world are considering the question of
transient copies, like those kept in replication and caching system,
being legal. Legal implications of replication and caching is
subject to local law.
Caching proxies need to preserve the protocol output, including
headers. Replication services need to preserve the source of the
objects.
9.3.5 Application level access
Caching proxies are application level components in the traffic flow
path, and may give intruders access to information that was only
available at network level equipment in a proxy-free world. Some
network level equipment may have required physical access to get
sensitive information, and introducing application level components
may require additional system security.
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10. Acknowledgements
[Ed note: No decision made on authors list. Submitters of individual
entries are acknowledged in the text. Need to sort out how to give
credits where they are due.]
David Forster, Cisco, dforster@cisco.com provided info on
Out-of-path Transparent Caching Proxies.
Alex Rousskov, David Forster, Josh Cohen and John Martin for
protocol information.
John Dilley, Ivan Lovric and Joe Touch for terminology and taxonomy
information.
David Forster, Josh Cohen, Henrik Nordstrom and Patrick McManus for
their help in defining proxy transparency.
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References
[1] Wessels, D., "Squid FAQ: Transparent Caching/Proxying.", July
1999.
[2] Danzig, P. and K.L. Swartz, "Transparent, Scalable, Failsafe
Web Caching", July 1999.
[3] Williams, B., "Transparent Web Caching Solutions.", July 1999.
[4] Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT (Work in
Progress).", July 1999.
[5] Melve, I., Slettjord, L., Verschuren, T. and H. Bekker, "Web
caching architecture; Technical report European Union
RE1004-M4.3", January 1999.
[6] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L.,
Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[7] Netscape, Inc., "Navigator Proxy Auto-Config File Format.",
July 1999.
[8] Gauthier, P., Cohen, J., Dunsmuir, M. and C. Perkins, "The Web
Proxy Auto-Discovery Protocol (work in progress)", June 1999.
[9] Valloppppillil, V. and K.W. Ross, "Cache Array Routing Protocol
(work in progress)", January 1999.
[10] Wessels, D. and K. Claffy, "Internet Cache Protocol (ICP),
Version 2", RFC 2186, September 1997.
[11] Wessels, D. and K. Claffy, "Application of Internet Cache
Protocol (ICP), Version 2", RFC 2187, September 1997.
[12] Lovric, I., "Internet Cache Protocol Extension (work in
progress)", January 1999.
[13] Wessels, D., "ICP Home Page", January 1999.
[14] University of Southern California and , "Internet Cache
Protocol Specification 1.4", September 1994.
[15] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and H. Frystyk, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945, May 1996.
[16] Cisco Systems, "Cisco Web Cache Coordination Protocol V1.0
(work in progress)", January 1999.
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[17] "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, January 1999.
[18] Moore, K., "On the use of HTTP as a Substrate for Other
Protocols (work in progress)", January 1999.
[19] Brisco, T., "DNS Support for Load Balancing", RFC 1794,
January 1999.
[20] "Transparent Proxy Agent Control Protocol (work in progress)",
January 1999.
[21] "Pre-filling a cache - A satellite overview (work in
progress).", January 1999.
[22] Hamilton, M., Rousskov, A. and D. Wessels, "Cache Digest
specification - version 5", December 1998.
[23] Vixie, P. and D. Wessels, "Hyper Text Caching Protocol
(HTCP/0.0) (work in progress)", August 1999.
[24] http://home.netscape.com/eng/mozilla/2.0/relnotes/demo/proxy-live.html
Authors' Addresses
Ingrid Melve
UNINETT
Tempeveien 22
Trondheim
Norway
Phone: +47 73 55 79 07
EMail: Ingrid.Melve@uninett.no
Gary Tomlinson
Novell Inc.
122 East 1700 South
Provo, Utah 84606
USA
Phone: +1 801 861 7021
EMail: garyt@novell.com
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Ian Cooper
Mirror Image Internet, Inc.
18 Commerce Way
Suite 4800
Woburn, MA 01801
USA
Phone: +1 781 939 0735
EMail: ian@mirror-image.com
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Acknowledgement
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